This paper uses the Cognitive Economics Study (CogEcon) to assess the effect of the financial crisis on the well-being of older Americans. Financial wealth fell by about 15 percent for the median household. These financial losses were concentrated among households with high levels of wealth and high cognitive capacities, who tend to have higher exposure to the stock market. Nonetheless, households with little financial wealth suffered declines in well-being-measured by declines in consumption-as large on average as households with substantial exposure to the stock market. Tight credit market conditions and adverse labor market outcomes account for much of the effect of the financial crisis on the consumption of these low-wealth households. This finding raises the possibility that those most directly affected by the stock market crash were well equipped to adjust to it. By construction, households with little total wealth were not directly affected by the financial crisis because they had no financial wealth at stake.
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This paper links several key findings. Holding a high fraction of wealth in the form of stock is correlated with having high cognitive status. Nonetheless, households with low levels of wealth reported being substantially affected by the financial crisis. These findings provide a nuanced picture of the effects of the financial crisis across older Americans. Those with disproportionate exposure to the financial crisis by virtue of having high shares of stock in their portfolios tend to have substantially higher cognitive capacity and greater wealth than average. This finding raises the possibility that those most directly affected by the stock market crash were well equipped to adjust to it. By construction, households with little total wealth were not directly affected by the financial crisis because they had no financial wealth at stake. Nonetheless, they report similar downward adjustments in consumption and delays in the expected date of retirement as households that experienced substantial financial losses. This finding points to effects of the financial crisis on economic security that greatly exceeded the direct loss of value in the stock market. The paper will examine credit and labor market factors that help explain the overall effects of the financial crisis and how it affected different households differently.
I. Who was affected by the financial crisis?
The financial crisis led to a large decline in stock market value with potentially very serious implications for retiree finance. By definition, the decline in the stock market directly affects only stockholders. This section will document some key characteristics of stockholders: They have relatively high wealth and relatively high cognitive status. Hence, stockholders, with relatively high wealth and relatively high cognitive capacity on average, might be better equipped than the average household to adjust to the financial crisis. On the other hand, the 3 financial crisis was not just about a decline in the stock market. It involved a sharp decline in housing equity, a sharp increase in unemployment, and broad disruptions of credit markets. The CogEcon study, particularly its post-crash survey, was designed to assess all of these developments. Table 1 Table 2 shows the components of financial wealth. 2 The first two columns of these tables
give the initial level of wealth. The next four columns give the mean, 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile of the percent change in wealth.
Overall, the median decline in wealth was 15% among all wealth holders (top line of Table 1 ). To get a greater sense of this heterogeneity, the next two lines divided the wealth holders into those who lost at least 10 percent and those who lost less than 10 percent. Those who lost at least 10 percent had substantially more wealth-almost twice the mean wealth and 3-1/2 times the median wealth. Higher wealth households have, on average, greater exposure to the stock market. Consequently, they experienced greater losses in the financial crisis. Indeed, conservatively invested portfolios, e.g., those weighted heavily toward Treasury securities, had lower losses or even gains.
2 The CogEcon 2009 Post-Crash survey does not replicate the complete battery of wealth questions from the 2008 survey. Instead it asks about a few important categories of wealth. In this paper, total financial wealth is the value of retirement accounts plus cash (bank accounts, money market mutual funds, and Treasury bills) and stock outside of retirement accounts. The survey asks for the percent change in the value of these assets since July 2008. These percent changes are tabulated in the Tables 1 and 2 . The July 2008 values are calculated by applying these percent changes to the 2009 values. There is ambiguity about whether respondents are using current or 2008 values as the denominator in computing the percent changes. For large changes, this distinction is significant. To calculate the 2008 levels, this paper uses the chained approach, that is, it treats the reported percent change as if it were the average of the of the base period and current period percent changes. In separate research, the CogEcon study team is exploring the difference between measuring change in wealth using the point-to-point comparisons of the levels versus the reported percent changes.
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The next panel of Table 1 shows the relationship of the level and change of financial wealth with cognition as measured by the number series score, which is a measure of fluid intelligence. 3 The rows give the statistics for wealthholders by the terciles of this score. There is a powerful relationship between both the level of fluid intelligence and both the level of wealth and the size of the loss. Both wealth and exposure to the stock market are increasing functions of cognition. Table 3 shows just how powerful the relationship is between cognition and stock ownership. Among wealthholders, the high cognition third of the sample has a median stock share of 41 percent while the low cognition third of the sample has a median stock share of 7 percent. Combined with the evidence from Table 1 , what emerges is that the high cognition group has more wealth and more of it in stock. Hence, those with high cognition took larger financial losses in the financial crisis. Put differently, low cognition individuals faced relatively low financial losses because they had relatively little stock.
Explaining the relationship between cognition, wealth, and the demand for risky assets is complicated. The demand for risky assets should be related to the level of risk tolerance. The
Cognitive Economics Study (CogEcon) contains the risk tolerance questions developed by Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997 [BJKS] ). The version of the question used on the CogEcon poses the following hypothetical. The respondent has inherited a million dollars and must make a once-and-for-all choice of investing it in a safe asset or a risky asset. The risky asset has a 50-50 chance of doubling or falling by various fractions. The respondent is asked whether he or she prefers the safe return or the risky return for different levels of the downside risk. This partitions respondents into six risk tolerance categories.
Using the techniques of BJKS and Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2008 [KSS] ), this paper imputes a value of relative risk tolerance (the inverse of relative risk aversion) to each 3 The number series score is based on the ability to complete sequences of numbers.
5 respondent to the CogEcon study. Table 4 shows a powerful correlation between "number series" (NS)-a standardized measure of fluid intelligence-and the level of relative risk tolerance. In separate work, Shapiro (2010) is examining whether it is possible to separate the channels by which cognition affects the demand for risky assets, i.e., whether it is solely through the preference channel documented in Table 4 , or whether there are independent effects of cognition on holding stocks, e.g., through understanding the stock market. For the purposes of this paper, it is simply important to know that those with high stock exposure during the financial crisis had that exposure based on choices that are powerfully related to having high cognitive status.
So far the discussion has focused on financial losses. It is important to bear in mind that a substantial minority of households have little direct exposure to financial markets by virtue of having little financial wealth. The last line of Table 1 reveals that about 20% of households in the 50+ age group have little financial wealth and therefore minimal direct exposure to the stock market crash. This group will be an important feature of our analysis. Notwithstanding its low exposure to the stock market, it turns out to have been substantially affected by the financial crisis.
The financial crisis of 2008-2009 originated in the housing market. Housing prices peaked in 2006-well in advance of the crisis. The ensuing financial distress, both at the household and systemic levels, gave impetus to the crisis and also has propagated its effects.
Housing price increases do not add net wealth to the society at large-an increase in housing prices raises asset values but also the cost of housing consumption. Older households, however, may plan to disinvest in housing, so housing capital gains can translate into an increase in nonhousing consumption for the CogEcon population. Inversely, the sharp, economy-wide drop in 6 housing prices could have a direct effect on well-being. Moreover, though the older population tends to have lower mortgage debt than the population at large, some older households have high debt tied to their house value. This paper will examine both the direct loss in home value and credit issues. The last two lines of Table 2 show the exposure of the CogEcon sample to the housing market. In this population, homeownership is ubiquitous. About 90% of the sample owns their home. The median value of the homes was $213,890 in July 2008. The median decline in home value was
10%
. 4 This loss in wealth is of similar order to the loss in financial wealth, and is spread over the population much more evenly.
Financial wealth and housing wealth are important, though far from complete, measures of resources. In particular, they ignore human capital, both future wages and the value of pensions and Social Security. Table 6 conveys an important message about thinking about the effects of the declines in the value of financial assets and housing.
Those that suffered substantial losses in value are starting from a relatively high-wealth position.
Those without tangible assets face financial distress despite having no financial losses owing to the crisis. The systemic effects of the credit crisis that caused access to credit be sharply curtailed could have substantial effects on households with little or no assets.
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The sharp decline in employment is another salient feature of the financial crisis. became more likely, and the probability of subsequent reemployment fell. For those contemplating leaving their long term job, either for full retirement or a bridge job, the option value of keeping the lifetime job increased: The probability of finding a bridge job fell, and the prospects for or re-entering the workforce if retirement did not work out declined. The lower panel of Table 7 The last two lines of Table 7 show that there are dramatic increases in expected retirement age owing to the financial crisis. Almost 40 percent of the nonretired respondents indicated that they would change their years of work owing to the financial crisis. The mean increase in work is 1.32 years. This includes the zero increase for those not planning to work longer, so the mean increase conditional on retiring later is several years. The response is greater for those with greater capital losses from the financial crisis. Interestingly, those with no wealth show as big a mean increase in years worked as those with substantial losses. This result points to widespread effects of the crisis beyond the direct effects on balance sheets of individuals.
CogEcon finds a bigger effect on retirement plans than studies that have looked at stock market expectations alone. 11 Again, the financial crisis had much broader implications for retirement than the change in the stock market alone owing to the correlated, adverse movements in housing prices and employment (re-employment/bridge job) prospects.
III. How did the financial crisis affect consumption?
The previous sections show how the effect of the financial crisis has multiple dimensions. The
CogEcon 2009 Post-crash survey finds losses in financial assets and housing wealth that align well with aggregate data. There is substantial heterogeneity in exposure to these asset marketsboth in terms of levels of asset and rate of capital loss. There is also substantial heterogeneity in resources to buffer against the fallout of the financial crisis. Households differ in levels of wealth and income. They also differ in labor force attachment and job prospects. Using the 11 CogEcon data, this paper can link together differing cognitive capacities, differing economic situations, and the consequences of the crisis for older Americans.
A. Measuring the consumption response
The change in consumption is a comprehensive measure of how well-being changes.
Older individuals should not be liquidity constrained because they are no longer on the upward portion of the age-earnings profile. Changes in consumption should therefore move proportionately with changes in lifetime resources-the sum of the present value of labor income, pensions, and Social Security, and financial assets. If components of consumption are additively separable in the utility function, then any one component can be used as an indicator of lifetime resources. It is customary to focus on nondurable consumption expenditures for such exercises (Hall, 1978 (Hall, , 1988 because the flow of consumption expenditure of nondurables is most likely to correspond to the flow of utility. In contrast, durables expenditures provide service flows over long periods of times, which complicates their use for assessing instantaneous utility (Mankiw, 1982) . spending on food that you use at home?" and similarly for "eating out" and "nondurable goods such as clothing, entertainment, transportation, recreation (including vacations), etc.?" For each of these categories of consumption, the respondents were asked to check off a box corresponding 12 to decreases of more than 10%, 6-10%, or 1-5%, no change (0%), or increases of 1-5%, 6-10%, or more than 10%. We translate these ranges into a single value using the mid-point of the range and plus or minus 15% for the open-ended ranges.
There are several reasons that we ask for individuals to report their response of consumption conditional on the crisis rather than comparing point-to-point measures of consumption. The first is practical. We do not have a comprehensive measure of consumption in the CogEcon 2008 baseline. 13 Additionally, using point-to-point consumption measures are notoriously noisy. We attempted to get better measurements by asking about changes directly.
The second issue is methodological. The survey question is designed to have the respondents condition on the effects of the crisis. While this might be hard for them to do, it is also hard to do so econometrically. nondurables. 14 The columns break the statistics into those who had larger and smaller financial losses, or no wealth at all (less than $10,000 financial wealth). Overall, consumption dropped 3 percent in response to the financial crisis. Assuming standard lifecycle/permanent income behavior, this is a permanent decline. As expected, food at home dropped less while food away from home and other nondurables fell more.
13 CogEcon 2008 does have the level of food consumption (see Table 5 ). We did not ask the corresponding level in 2009 owing to constraints on survey time and the decision to use the percent change approach discussed here. 14 The composite is the simple average of food at home, food away from home, and other nondurables. Conceptually, the correct weights are the marginal expenditure shares. These are likely to be very different from the average expenditure shares. In particular, food at home is an order of magnitude larger than food away from home, but much less responsive to income and wealth. Additionally, the percent changes are likely to be measured with error. If the error variance across categories is similar, that tends to equalize the weights. Clearly, it would be possible to do something more sophisticated than averaging, but the outcome of such an exercise is likely not to be substantially different from a simple average.
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The overall level of consumption decline makes a good deal of sense given the magnitude of the shock. Housing and financial wealth fell 10 and 15% respectively. These assets are only a fraction of most households' lifetime resources, which include future earnings, pensions, and Social Security. Additionally, the initial drop in consumption could be attenuated by adjustment costs, habit, or an expectation of a rebound in asset values.
The heterogeneity in response of consumption is also very interesting. Those who lost more wealth report larger declines in consumption as one would expect. Those who have little wealth, however, look more like those who had big losses than those who had more modest losses. This same U-shaped response is found for the response of labor discussed above. Thus for both consumption and labor supply, those with little wealth are as much affected by the economic crisis as those with substantial losses. The response of consumption to the crisis is fairly flat across the level of cognition. That opens the possibility that there are offsetting factors related to cognitive capacity-high exposure to the stock market among the high cognition group might be offset by a greater capacity of high cognition individuals to buffer shocks. The effects of owning a home are also instructive. The small minority who do not own a home are more exposed to the crisis using the consumption metric as the majority of homeowners. The multivariate analysis of the next subsection will attempt to sort out these channels through which the crisis affected consumption.
The CogEcon 2009 Post-crash survey also includes a question about delaying or cancelling the purchase of a car in response to the crisis. The responses to these questions are tabulated in the last line of Table 8 . Overall, 16% of respondents delayed purchasing a vehicle.
There is the same U-shaped pattern in response to wealth changes: those with little wealth look like those with large losses.
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B. Analyzing the consumption response
The effects of the financial crisis are quite complicated. There is the direct effect of capital losses on financial assets and housing. But those without assets, and who therefore did not have capital losses, were also strongly affected by the crisis. Section II suggests that credit and labor market conditions were important for some households. Additionally, cognitive capacity appears to have a role in buffering the effect of the crisis. As Section I shows, high cognition individuals were more exposed to the financial crisis by virtue of having greater stock market exposure, but they also might have capacity or resources to better deal with adverse shocks. High cognition is correlated with many factors-education and wealth notably-which also are resources for buffering adverse shocks. This section pursues a multivariate approach to sort out the influence of financial, credit market, labor market, and cognitive factors on the effects of the financial crisis on the well-being of older Americans. Specifically, we now turn to considering a regression of the composite consumption change measure on these factors plus standard demographic variables.
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Wealth. Tables 9A and 9B report the results of this multivariate analysis. The first column focuses on the direct effect of wealth. The dependent variable is the percent change in consumption. The independent variables include the percent change in financial wealth (tabulated in Table 1 ) and a dummy for having little financial wealth (less than $10,000 in retirement accounts, cash or equivalent, or stocks outside of retirement accounts). It also includes dummies for being the financial respondent within a couple, sex, education, and race.
Age is measured continuously (by decade). Observations are at the individual level, so 15 households with two respondents are in the regression twice. 16 The effect of the change in financial wealth on consumption growth is substantial and tightly estimated. The mean change in wealth is 15%, so the estimated coefficient of 0.019 corresponds to a 0.3 percentage point drop in consumption, on average, from the capital losses on financial wealth owing to the crisis.
17
The multivariate analysis confirms that the effect of the financial crisis on those with little wealth was substantial. The marginal effect on consumption growth of being in this group is to reduce consumption by almost 2 percentage points-much larger than the direct effect of capital losses for wealthholders. This direct effect of having no wealth becomes attenuated by the inclusion of other factors correlated with having little wealth, but it will remain a substantial part of characterizing the financial crisis.
Demographics. Briefly consider the demographic covariates. Being a financial respondent reduces consumption growth and being male raises it. Financial respondents are disproportionately male, so these effects are somewhat offsetting. Being highly educated leads to a substantial and statistically significant fall in consumption following the crisis. Blacks suffered almost a 2 percent excess decline in consumption. There is a strong effect of age on consumption growth.
Column 2 of Table 9A adds a dummy for being retired (both retired if a couple). Being retired reduces the decline in consumption according to the point estimate, but the effect has a large standard error.
Housing and economic status. The financial crisis had effects far beyond the stock market. Indeed, the decline in house prices started several years in advance of the crisis.
Columns 3 and 4 broaden the range of variables for explaining the reaction to the financial crisis by adding covariates relating to home ownership and overall economic status. These regressions include a dummy for being a homeowner and a measure of the change in the value of the home.
Recall from the discussion of homeownership ( Table 2 ) that almost 90 percent of individuals in the CogEcon are homeowners. Hence, it is not surprising that the homeownership dummy is not statistically significant, though its point estimate is large. The magnitude of the coefficient of change in home value (measured based on self-reported assessment of change of home values in the respondent's neighborhood) is similar to that for the change in wealth, though it has a somewhat larger standard error. Overall, the point estimates relating to the effect of homeownership on change in consumption are in line with those of financial wealth, but the sample has too little variation to say anything precise about the size of these effects.
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Column 4 adds the log levels of income, food expenditure, and wealth-all measured as of 2008. Income and food consumption have effects that are imprecisely estimated. The effect of wealth is positive and significant.
Cognition. The results earlier in the paper show a powerful association between cognition and economic outcomes. High cognition individuals have greater wealth and greater stock market exposure. On the other hand, low cognition individuals appear to be disproportionately affected by the crisis. Since cognition is related to so many aspects of economic and social status, it is not clear whether it has an independent effect on how the crisis affected individuals, or whether it is a proxy for other correlates of cognition such as age, education, or wealth. The multivariate approach pursued here addresses this question. Table 9A introduces cognition into the regression specification in column 5. Several interesting results emerge from this specification. First, cognition is strongly significant in explaining the response of consumption to the financial crisis even after controlling for demographics, economic status, Table 9A , Column 6 reports a regression adding a dummy variable for reporting two or more of these indicators of financial distress.
Having this indicator of financial distress is a powerful explanatory variable for the change in consumption. It reduces consumption growth by about 3-3/4 percentage points. Including this financial distress indicator also somewhat attenuates the coefficients on having low financial wealth and being a homeowner, suggesting that an important channel for the effects of low 18 wealth is increased susceptibility to financial distress. These changes are not statistically significant because of the inclusion of the level of wealth and income in the specification, which are collinear with the low-wealth indicator.
While the drop in consumption associated with financial distress is very large, it is unlikely to be permanent. Credit constrained individuals cannot smooth consumption over time.
A tightening of credit conditions, all other things equal, would reduce the consumption of the credit constrained temporarily.
Labor supply. Adjustments to labor supply should go hand-in-hand with adjustments in consumption. Ten percent of those not retired report losing a job as a consequence of the financial crisis. This off-the-labor-supply-curve outcome has a significant impact on consumption as reported in Table 9B , Column 1. Whether it is permanent or not is hard to increasing hours in response to lower wealth versus decreasing hours owing to involuntary cutbacks in work. Putting these margins of adjustment of labor together in Table 9B , column 6, the effect of job loss and returning to work is somewhat attenuated while the comovement of years of work and consumption remains essentially unchanged.
Summary. The last column of Table 9B includes the cognition, financial distress, and labor supply covariates jointly. Cognition and financial distress remain statistically significant in this specification. The size of the effect of cognition is also largely unaffected by the inclusion of the other covariates. Controlling for wealth, financial distress, labor supply, and demographics, there is a strong effect of having high cognition in limiting the consumption effects of the crisis. Financial distress's effect on consumption is modestly attenuated in the full multivariate specification, though it remains a very significant correlate of adverse effects of the crisis.
D. Delays in Vehicle Purchases
Changes in automobile purchases during the crisis are of special interest for several reasons.
Because vehicles are durable, their purchase can be very sensitive to economic conditions. For a household that already owns a serviceable vehicle, deferring a purchase can be a relatively attractive margin for adjusting to tight credit, reduced income or wealth, or uncertainty about future economic conditions. There is little loss in utility from holding onto a vehicle a bit longer than planned. The decline in vehicle sales was indeed one of the important factors that magnified the effect of the financial crisis on economic activity. Tables 10A and 10B examine what factors led to the deferral of purchases of vehicles. 
IV. Summary
The CogEcon Post-crash survey has a rich set of covariates that help explain why the effects of the financial crisis were so widespread. The paper presents multivariate analyses of the effects of the financial crisis, taking the decline in planned consumption as the indicator of the effects of the crisis.
 Having financial losses is strongly associated with a decline in consumption. For the mean household with financial assets, these losses reduce consumption by about 0.3 percentage points.
 Having little or no financial wealth is, however, associated with even larger drops in consumption.
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 Within the population aged 50 years and older, homeownership is ubiquitous. Almost 90% of the CogEcon respondents are homeowners. The declines in house values they report is about the same as the average decline in wealth. Across households, the decline in house values accounts for roughly the same amount of the decline in consumption as the decline in financial wealth.
 A substantial minority of households report financial distress. Housing-related financial distress is rare in this population. Being denied credit or making a late payment is more common. Financial distress is much more common among the non-wealth holders. They are five times more likely to report more than one indicator of financial distress than those with positive financial wealth.
 Reductions in leisure-in the form of returning to work and postponing retirement are also common responses to the financial crisis and go hand in hand with the decrease in consumption.
 Controlling for a broad range of financial factors, there remains a role for the level of cognition in explaining the effects of the financial crisis. Source: CogEcon 2009 Post-Crash survey. For financial wealth, excludes respondents with less than $10,000 total financial wealth. Source: CogEcon 2008 and CogUSA. Number series is scored so the population average is 500, so the CogUSA has above-average cognition. 
